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Introduction
Setting up of healthcare system for Indochina’s plantation workers  only emerged as a
priority to local colonial authorities in the mid-1920s, lagging years behind British Malaya
and the Dutch East Indies. Basic healthcare had become not just an economic issue but
also a social issue jeopardizing the future of the huge rubber tree plantations that had
recently been opened by major French financial backers and industrial groups that had lost
over half their workforce due to death, disease, repatriation or evasion in the space of just
two years.
 This communication deals with healthcare with a focus on the allegedly “unique in the
private sector” healthcare service first provided by Michelin in 1929  to cover over 6,000
native  workers  in  its  two  plantations.  This  example  is  original  because  the  Michelin
plantations have often been decribed as the toughest, while the company was the symbol
of paternalism in metropolitan France.
The analysis developed here draws heavily on an extensive and very well illustrated report
drafted  by  Doctor  Maurice  Warnecke,  a  malaria  expert,  born  in  1898,  who  was  first
assigned to the Department of medical assistance for Indochina in 1922 before joining
Michelin in 1929 as head of the health department. His report looked to demonstrate the
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economic value of introducing an in-plantation healthcare scheme. The report never got
publicly released — almost certainly because Michelin, at that time, was at loggerheads
with other planters.
We start out by learning that both planters and the authorities failed to heed repeated
warnings from the medical community until 1928. Up to this time, blame for the failure of
sanitary measures was essentially laid on the native workers, with the local administration
second in line. Planter's investment in healthcare came very late on — and not before a
spate of worker  deaths that, even today, remains a symbol of colonial violence.
We move on to look at what Michelin achieved after 1929, notably through the construction
of an exemplary model hospital. We see how the investment effort helped galvanize the
company’s  reputation,  and  we  investigate   if  these  investment,  which  was  primarily
oriented towards improving workers’ physical condition rather psychological condition, was
profitable.
I- A belated recognition of the appalling sanitary condition of the workforce
A- Disregarded warnings
The industrial  and financial  majors running rubber production in Indochina turned their
eyes to the red-earth in Cochinchina as early as the 1910s, with a view to setting up huge
capitalistically-engineered plantations within this area of dense forest ideal for rubber tree
growth  but  harmful  to  workers’  health.  The  growing  workforce  was  given  fixed-term
contracts, and most came from the poor overpopulated regions of Tonkin.
Michitake Aso recently demonstrated that despite the medical community’s efforts from
1919 on to  alert  planters and local  authorities on  the need to  take measures against
malaria, almost nothing was done until 1925 when a medical entomology laboratory on
malaria was opened. The planters systematically refused to comply with the rare legal
provisions  on  health  and  waved  away  comments  from  the  competent  government
departments. No money was actually allocated by the authorities to this field.
The situation  got  worse  when  tens of  thousands of  workers  were  transported  in  from
Tonkin in under four years,  starting in 1924. Planters essentially made efforts to issue
quinine,  which  has been legislated  for  since 1922,  and to  educate  coolies  on  how to
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preserve their own health. Once faced with the failure of this policy, the planters threw all
responsibility on the natives themselves.
B- The coolie is the culprit
The behaviour of Michelin’s top-echelon management is symptomatic of this mindset. The
plantation  doctor  considers  that  the  coolies’  physical  condition  on  arrival  is  appalling
“because most of the time the people of Tonkin enlist only when at their wit’s end and after
suffering from malnutrition and a complete lack of hygiene”. These indentured workers are
depicted as “often depraved, trying to escape justice […], washed up, skirting around the
medical examination, wholly inapt for work”. The doctor also complains about the alleged
“primitive  lifestyle  of  Annam  people  when  it  comes  to  hygiene  and  their  attitude  to
disease”.   
Natives are not only laid to blame, they are also supposed to learn, which starts through
punishment. The doctor recommends that those who take off their bandage, forget to wash
or be treated should be disciplined. For those suspected of feigning weakness or illness,
the director of the Michelin plantation in Dầu Tiếng orders a fine amounting to the daily
wage. Ipecacuanha was administered to workers suffering from bellyache to force them to
vomit and deter them from complaining. Being provided with a mosquito net, which was
essential to avoid bites, was not considered a right but a reward.
Coolies that refused to swallow their quinine pills had to take them dissolved in water,
which has an incredibly bad taste.  The white man was supposed to be a model.  The
European assistant have to take his own tablets in front of recently arrived workers.  A
large  poster  in  the  refectory  of  Michelin’s  hospital (see  picture  1) portrays  a  huge
Bibendum, the world-recognized symbol of the company, benevolently taking a coolie’s
shoulder  and  advising  him  to  take  his  dose  of  quinine.  Paternalism  at  its  best,  and
undertones threatening violence!
Racial prejudice served as a justification for the colonial system to impose tough working
conditions and strict discipline in a much-monitored environment.
C-  The administration’s fault
Planters reproached the authorities for the lack of adequate hospital infrastructure in the
territory.  Above all,  they were scathing on how labor law reform enacted by Governor-
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General  Alexandre  Varenne  in  October  1927  targeted  the  plantations.  This  law
strengthened  the  power  of  planters  on  indentured  workers  but  also  contributed  to  an
improvement in the coolies’ health through specific obligations imposed on planters: pre-
recruitment  checkups,  food  rations  to  be  provided  for  free,  healthcare,  housing  and
sanitation.  There  was  indeed  urgent  need  to  do  something,  as  the  numerous  deaths
among workers threatened to halt not just production but also the influx of workers — that
was how bad the company’s image had become.
D- A true hecatomb
Surveys led by the labour inspectorate and the Pasteur Institute arrived at much the same
conclusion. About 90% of coolies of the red-earth heartland suffered from malaria and
almost all had to be hospitalized once a month. The number of coolies either sick, dead or
on the run reached almost half the entire workforce in some of the biggest plantations,
which obviously also translated into a significant loss of earnings.
In Indochinese plantations as a whole, the death rate evolved as follows: 5.4% in 1927,
2.83% in 1929 and 1.72% in 1932. These average rates mask the diversity of  on-the-
ground situations. Data from 11 of the 20 biggest plantations (those counting over 700
workers) show that the death rate fluctuated between 12% and 47% in 1926 and 1927!
The head of Bù Đốp, where 47% of coolies died in 1927, managed to justify this figure by
a “need to make sacrifices at the start of the plantation”!
Phú Riềng, the Michelin site in the Red earth, was among these huge deadly plantations:
17 % of workers died in 1927 and another 15% the following year — all young men. The
inexistent sanitary measures and relentless work required of the coolies go a large way to
explaining these two-digit figures: malaria hit workers that were already on their knees.
Deaths alone don’t sum up the losses. Close to a third of the workforce was unfit for work,
and up to 20% of those tied up by a contract would be on the run, as was the case with
Phú Riềng in 1927. Self-mutilation and suicides were also prominent.  
Michelin's other plantation in Dầu Tiếng is often taken as symbol of colonial violence :
according to figures released in 1965 by Điệp Liên Anh book's and repeated by various
historians, 11 376 persons, a quarter of the workforce should have died there between
1924 and 1951. These statistics were made up, the actual death rate never exceeded 3 %.
Colonial brutality nevertheless was a reality...
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Alarmed by a productivity that was way under forecasts, Michelin realized in 1928 that it
had to act. As Doctor Warnecke, who was recruited shortly after, said: “It  is no longer
possible to replace a worn-down coolie like a “spare part”. There is no never-ending flow of
workforce”. He insisted on the vital need to improve both the physical and mental health of
the  coolies  to  ultimately  make  them  more  efficient.  Michelin  heard  the  first
recommendation, not the second...
E- Sanitation works came late
The delay in starting sanitation work proves the lack of awareness of malaria-related risks.
While the Pasteur Institute demonstrated as early as 1918 that sanitation and keeping
housing  areas  away  from  mosquito-breeding  sites  were  the  single  most  important
preventive actions, most planters – Michelin included – simply ignored these factors when
setting  up  their  concessions,  yet  the  outlays  involved  would  have  been  relatively
insignificant: even in plantations where drainage works were substantial (Snoul and Mimot
for example), the costs amounted to barely 0.6% of total expenditure.
At  Michelin  in  Phú  Riềng,  the  Pasteur  Institute  noted  at  the  end  of  1928  that  the
distribution of quinine was under-resourced and badly supervised, and that no anti-malaria
initiative had been taken in the first two years. Work to drain the swamp and install drains
did not start until November 1929. In other major concessions, similar work did not start
until  deep  into  the  1930s.  While  the  1927  regulation  enabled  the  authorities  to  force
planters  to  undertake  such  works,  there  is  no  evidence  whatsoever  of  any  such
intervention.
II- Michelin’s achievements and the consequent benefits
From early 1929 on, Michelin’s management back in Clermont-Ferrand decided to create a
« unique private sanitary facility in Indochina ».
The turning point was the recruitment of Doctor Warnecke and the forthright diagnosis he
made  on  the  sanitary  and  moral  condition  of  workers.  He  was  well  aware  that  the
improvement of the coolie’s health could not be achieved only through prophylaxis or the
setup of a healthcare infrastructure. There was also a need for better food, housing and
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hygiene ; education, leisure activities and spiritual life had to be encouraged ; special care
should be given to women and children while the workload should be more proportionate
to each one’s might.
That the director of the antimalaria department of the colony came to Phú Riềng for his
first  on-ground  experiments  demonstrates  how  influential  Michelin  was.  His
recommendations  were  duly  followed  and proved  very  useful.  A  few weeks  later,  the
Institute receives a 20000 piastres donation from Michelin, that was representing 10% of
its annual budget. The company became the sole one in Indochina to hire an expert in
antimalaria engineering, and it is the first to build coverded drains, much more effective.
She is the first to replace the usual quinine pills with sweeter, candy-like tablets that were
more easily accepted.  
The  attention  paid  to  Michelin  by  the  authorities  is  emblematic  of  the  overall  support
brought to major plantations to the detriment of natives elsewhere.
It is only with the Varenne regulation that the first specific sanitary obligations imposed
upon planters came into force. Ratios of nurses and infirmary beds were set according to
the number of coolies ; above a certain threshold, the presence of a doctor was required.  
The Michelin hospital, which opened in July 1929, has been time and again named as a
model  because  of  his  size (see  picture  2),  its  equipment  and  organization,  but  also
because it remained for years the only one in Indochinese plantations. Four such facilities
existed in Indochina in the latter in 1937, compared to close to 300 in Malaysia !
The hospital in Dầu Tiếng had 240 beds at first and was staffed with 20 native nurses.
Means and competences were centralized at the hospital to avoid the mistakes and late
diagnosis which were previously common in the emergency units set up within the villages
and were partially accountable for the numerous deaths.
Coolies were sorted out at their arrival on the plantation according to their working capacity
and sick people at the hospital according to their disease. Hygiene had to be perfect and
different units were created to deal with the various functions. Patients were followed up
with very detailed medical cards. The facility also included a maternity ward, an efficient
laboratory and other units.
The efforts undertaken after 1929 contributed to slightly improve the situation. While 10.2
% of Dầu Tiếng’s workers were sick in November 1928, this figure had been lowered to
3.3% twelve months later.  In Phú Riềng, the death rate declined from 17 % in 1927 to 3.3
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% in 1929, below the average rate for the colony, mostly thanks to advances in the fight
against malaria. Unfit workers amounted to barely 5 % at the end of 1928 (and 3 % in May
1930) compared to 17% a year earlier.  
While a day at the Michelin hospital cost 1.84 piastres, that is three times more than at a
public facility, the company managed to keep its health expenditures below previous levels
thanks to the decrease in hospitalizations. Most of all, this was a profitable investment as
the number  of  coolies  fit  to  work  dramatically  increased.  The same kind  of  return  on
investment  could  be  witnessed  with  the  Michelin  medical  care  offered  to  workers  in
France.
600,000 piastres, staff costs included, were spent by Michelin between 1926 and 1930 for
its healthcare scheme, 200,000 were devoted to the hospital. To serve as a comparison,
we know that the thirty five Michelin's Europeans employees costing 350,000 piastres to
the company in 1928.
In Phú Riềng, in 1938, medical costs amounted to 4.6% of total expenditures, with 14,480
piastres. This was quite insignificant compared to an overall profit of 8.4 million.
The significant sums spent on healthcare and the very well organized system were at first
commended  by  the  authorities,  such  as  the  Department  of  Health  Service,  which
considered in January 1930 that the hospital was « unique », « remarkable » and could be
taken as model everywhere in Indochina and in the neighboring colonies.
Yet, even putting significant means in doesn’t solve every problem. As a matter of fact,
less than one month after Michelin had won praise from the government, almost all coolies
rebelled in Phú Riềng !
The  lack  of  reactivity  from  the  nurses  and  the  inadequate  follow-up  of  patients  was
highlighted in various reports, including internal ones, and contributed to the worsening of
preexisting  pathologies.  This  situation  arose  from the  pressure  imposed  upon  nurses,
which reflected the contradicting interests of the company : keep workers healthy but at
the same time punish the « cheaters » and  have as many coolies as possible at work.  
A 1937 report bemoaned Michelin’s disregard for the rule compelling plantations with more
than  1,000  workers  to  have  an  on-site  doctor  at  any  given  time.  The  administration
reminds the law but it does not oblige Michelin to apply it.
  In  1937  again,  the  Governor  General  of  Cochinchina  acknowledged  the  company’s
achievements, such as this « wonderful » but « deserted » hospital. However, he most of
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all mentions the « absolutely deplorable planter’s mentality » on Michelin’s premises.  He
criticizes the sordid aspects of  workers'  housing and how the coolies were  treated as
prisoners regularly insulted and sometimes beaten.    
Conclusion
Although Michelin committed as early as in 1926 to implement social measures similar to
those set up for its employees in France, nothing was done until  1929. Other planters
acted in  the  same way.  The impact  on  the  workers’  health  and fitness for  work  was
however  undervalued.  The  growing  difficulty  in  renewing  the  workforce,  the  Varenne
regulation of late 1927 and the soon-to-come economic crisis forced the planters to act.
Yet,  there  has  never  been  any  penalty  even  when  they  balked  at  taking  initiatives.
Reacting more swiftly than his competitors, Michelin then invested significant amounts into
a healthcare system, which proved profitable. Health-related costs actually dramatically
decreased  and  the  coolies'  physical  condition  improved.  Michelin's  workers  got  better
medical  care  than others  but  were  mishandled and got  the  worst  housing.  Only  their
fitness  for  work  mattered  so  as  to  increase  the  production.
Thanks to the better health of the coolies and to taylorization, productivity increased and
so did the workers' workload, making Michelin's plantations some of the most profitable
worldwide.
As a result, living and working conditions in the plantations have been portrayed up to now
in  a  very  negative  way.  This  is  especially  true  for  Michelin’s,  which  have  often  been
described as the harshest and most inhuman plantations, while they were probably those
with the highest level of commitment to a healthier environment.
In conclusion, I would like to express my warmest appreciation to the Scientific Committee
of  the  Conference  for  accepting  my paper.  Special  thanks  are  also  due  to  professor
Laurence Monnais for presenting my work to you today and to my brother for translating it
into English.
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Illustrations
Picture 1 : Michelin's Hospital : Dầu Tiếng, near 1930. In. Docteur Warnecke, Une expérience sanitaire sur
les  plantations  Michelin, juillet  1931.  Mise  à  jour  Mai  1932.  Michelin's  archives.  Thanks  to  Christophe
Bonneuil for the copy. 
Picture 2 : Michelin's Hospital : Dầu Tiếng, near 1930. Source : Archives nationales d'outre Mer. Aix-en-
Provence.
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